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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In an era of aggressive commercial competition, this 
appeal raises unsurprising, although important, issues of 
trademark confusion in the banking and insurance 
industries. Commerce Insurance Agency, Inc. (CIA), a small 
corporation engaged in the insurance business in Southern 
New Jersey for over thirteen years, sought an injunction in 
the United Sates District Court for the District of New 
Jersey prohibiting Commerce National Insurance Services 
(CNIS), a recently formed corporation, from using the 
"Commerce" mark to promote its insurance business. CNIS 
is a wholly owned subsidiary of Commerce Bancorp, Inc. 
(CBI) which had used the "Commerce" mark in connection 
with its banking services prior to CIA's adoption of the 
mark. The District Court denied CIA relief on the ground 
that CIA could not assert rights to the mark against either 
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CBI or CNIS because of CBI's prior use of the mark. CIA 
timely appealed. We will reverse.1 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
Commerce Bancorp, Inc. commenced operations in 1973 
with the opening of a single branch in Marlton, New Jersey. 
In December of 1974, it began offering credit life insurance 
and credit disability insurance in connection with its 
lending services. By 1983, CBI had opened six branches 
and controlled more than $100 million in assets. By the 
time this litigation was commenced, CBI had opened more 
than fifty branches and exercised control over nearly $3 
billion in deposits. Since January of 1973, CBI has 
promoted its banking services under the Commerce mark. 
 
Commerce Insurance Agency commenced its insurance 
business in April of 1983, with a single office in Cedar 
Brook, New Jersey. After five years of growth, CIA moved to 
larger offices in Sicklersville, New Jersey. Since its 
establishment in 1983, CIA has promoted its insurance 
services under the "Commerce" mark. 
 
From 1983 until 1996, CBI and CIA coexisted amicably 
in Southern New Jersey despite their use of the same mark 
to identify their respective services. CIA opened business 
accounts in its name with CBI, secured lines of credit from 
CBI, and rented a safe deposit box from it. CIA and CBI 
also referred customers to each other during this span of 
years. CIA's principal, Robert Loser, established a"good" 
relationship with a CBI branch manager and a "personal" 
relationship with CBI's regional vice president. This 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and review the 
District Court's factual findings for clear error. See American Home 
Prods. Corp. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370 (3d Cir. 1987). Clear 
error exists when giving all due deference to the opportunity of the trial 
judge to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the evidence, 
we are left with a definite and firm conviction that mistake has been 
committed. See Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. , 50 F.3d 189, 209 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
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relationship led to an invitation from CBI requesting CIA to 
participate in CBI's 5th Annual Commerce Golf Classic. CIA 
accepted the invitation, and CBI printed CIA's name as a 
contributor in CBI's annual program booklet as well as on 
a sign posted at the tournament. Throughout the thirteen 
year period between 1983 and 1996, neither CIA nor CBI 
were aware that anyone believed that the companies were 
business affiliates of each other. 
 
On July 25, 1996, CBI announced its intention to enter 
into the general insurance services industry. Within one 
month of that announcement, CIA began taking steps 
designed to shore up its position for a potential trademark 
dispute. On August 26, 1996, CIA filed a service mark 
registration application with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office seeking federal registration of the 
"Commerce" mark for insurance services. The application 
was granted. On August 28, 1996, CIA filed a service mark 
registration application with the New Jersey Secretary of 
State (the "Secretary") seeking state registration of the 
business name "Commerce Insurance Agency." The 
Secretary registered the name on September 3, 1996. On 
the same day, CIA filed a service mark registration 
application with the Secretary seeking registration of the 
business name "Commerce National Insurance Agency." 
The Secretary registered the name on September 11, 1996. 
 
By November of 1996, CBI had acquired two existing 
insurance agencies from which CBI formally established 
CNIS. At this time, CNIS began promoting its services 
under the names "Commerce National Insurance Services" 
or "Commerce Insurance." In December of 1996, CBI 
purchased two additional insurance agencies and added 
them to CNIS. These additions made CNIS the 58th largest 
insurance agency in the United States, having a customer 
base of more than 38,000 individuals and businesses and 
maintaining more than $150 million of insurance coverage. 
 
Instances of confusion between CIA and CNIS began to 
develop in 1997. In the early part of that year, CIA 
contacted an insurance carrier to track down a missing 
policy. On the assumption that CIA had been acquired by 
CBI, the carrier asked what CIA's agency code number had 
been prior to its purchase by CBI. Later, in May of that 
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year, CNIS and CIA began to receive each other's mail. CIA 
also began to receive telephone calls intended for CNIS. 
When CIA brought these instances of confusion to the 
attention of CNIS in June of 1997, CNIS denied the 
existence of any confusion. 
 
B. 
 
Shortly thereafter, however, CBI and CNIS filed a petition 
for cancellation of CIA's federal registration of the 
"Commerce" mark. CBI and CNIS also filed a complaint in 
the United States District Court contending, inter alia, that 
CIA's use of the Commerce mark infringed CBI's rights in 
the mark. CIA responded to the actions of CBI and CNIS by 
commencing an action of its own. In its complaint, CIA 
alleged, inter alia, that CNIS's use of the Commerce mark 
infringed CIA's rights in that mark. 
 
The District Court consolidated the two actions, and the 
parties filed applications for preliminary relief based solely 
on the federal trademark issue.2 CBI and CNIS sought 
preliminarily to enjoin CIA from using the Commerce mark 
to promote its insurance services. CIA, in turn, sought a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting CNIS from promoting its 
insurance services under the Commerce mark. After 
reviewing the parties' briefs and hearing oral argument, the 
District Court issued an opinion and order in which it 
declined to grant either CBI's and CNIS's request 
preliminarily to enjoin CIA from using the Commerce mark 
or CIA's request preliminarily to enjoin CNIS from using the 
Commerce mark. 
 
In reaching its decision, the District Court first 
determined that CBI's rights in the Commerce mark were 
senior to those of CIA. The District Court concluded that, 
as of 1983, the time CIA began its use of the Commerce 
mark, CBI had established secondary meaning in the 
Commerce mark. See Commerce Nat'l Ins. Servs. v. 
Commerce Ins. Agency, 995 F. Supp. 490, 499 (D.N.J. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although the parties do not clearly identify the statute on which they 
base their claims, it appears that they charge a violation of the Lanham 
Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1125. 
 
                                5 
  
1998). Additionally, the Court found that CIA's use of the 
Commerce mark in 1983 was likely to create confusion, 
because reasonable consumers dealing with CIA "would 
have assumed that they were dealing with CBI or some CBI 
affiliate or offshoot." Id. at 499-501. Accordingly, the 
District Court concluded that CBI's rights to the Commerce 
mark were senior to those of CIA and that CBI's rights to 
the mark "encompassed" both the banking and insurance 
services industries. See id. at 501. 
 
After reaching this conclusion, the District Court 
proceeded to determine whether CBI was entitled to 
preliminarily enjoin CIA from using the Commerce mark. In 
addressing this issue, the Court reasoned that CBI's 
fourteen year delay in enforcing its rights constituted 
laches and that therefore CBI was not entitled to the 
injunctive relief it sought. See id. at 503. Nevertheless, the 
District Court recognized that although CBI was estopped 
from invoking its right to prevent CIA from using the mark, 
it had not lost its rights in the mark altogether. See id. at 
505. Accordingly, the Court held that although CBI was not 
entitled to a preliminary injunction against CIA, CBI's 
wholly owned subsidiary, CNIS, could not be preliminarily 
enjoined from using the Commerce mark by CIA. See id. 
 
C. 
 
Approximately eleven months later, the parties returned 
to the District Court seeking a final disposition of their 
claims. They entered into a stipulation requesting the 
District Court to enter a final judgment based on: (1) the 
record created in connection with the parties' cross 
applications for preliminary relief; (2) their respective expert 
reports (but without any testimony from either expert); and 
(3) supplemental briefs directed to the admissibility of those 
reports. The District Court obliged, and on January 20, 
1999, it issued a final judgment in which it again declined 
to grant any party's request for injunctive relief with respect 
to the Commerce mark. 
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II. 
 
On appeal, CIA contends that the District Court erred in 
concluding that CBI, by virtue of its use of the Commerce 
mark within the banking industry, acquired rights in the 
mark that extend to the insurance services industry. More 
specifically, CIA argues that the District Court committed 
clear error in finding that as of 1983 CBI had established: 
(1) secondary meaning in the Commerce mark within the 
insurance services industry; (2) ownership of the Commerce 
mark within the insurance services industry; and (3) that 
CIA's use of the Commerce mark was likely to create 
confusion in the minds of reasonable consumers. CIA 
requests this Court to reverse these findings and remand 
the case for consideration of its claim for injunctive relief 
against CNIS.3 
 
III. 
 
"The law of trademark protects trademark owners in the 
exclusive use of their marks when use by another would be 
likely to cause confusion." Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 
F.2d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 1983). A claim of trademark 
infringement is established when the plaintiff proves that: 
(1) its mark is valid and legally protectable; (2) it owns the 
mark; and (3) the defendant's use of the mark to identify its 
goods or services is likely to create confusion concerning 
the origin of those goods or services. See Opticians Ass'n of 
Am. v. Independent Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
 
If the mark at issue is federally registered and has 
become incontestible, then validity, legal protectability, and 
ownership are proved. See Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor 
Prods., 930 F.2d 277, 292 (3d Cir. 1991). If the mark has 
not been federally registered or, if registered, has not 
achieved incontestability,4 then"validity depends on proof 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. CIA also requests that the case be remanded for consideration of its 
claim for damages. However, on the record before us, there seems to be 
no evidence as to the amount of damages CIA sustained. 
 
4. A mark becomes incontestible after the ownerfiles affidavits stating 
that the mark has been registered, that it has been in continuous use for 
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of secondary meaning, unless the unregistered or 
contestable mark is inherently distinctive." 5 Id. A plaintiff 
must establish secondary meaning in a mark at the time 
and place that the defendant began use of the mark. See 
Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 
1231 (3d Cir. 1978); J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on 
Trademarks and Unfair Competition S 15:4 (4th ed. 1997) 
[hereinafter "Trademarks"]. 
 
Secondary meaning exists when the mark "is interpreted 
by the consuming public to be not only an identification of 
the product or services, but also a representation of the 
origin of those products or services." Scott Paper Co. at 
1228. In general, it is established through extensive 
advertising which creates in the minds of consumers an 
association between the mark and the provider of the 
services advertised under the mark. See id. Under certain 
circumstances, a mark "can develop secondary meaning as 
to goods or services to which the mark has not been 
applied." Id. The rationale for extending protection of a 
mark into a noncompeting market are the potential dangers 
that: "(1) the reputation of the holder of the mark may be 
tarnished or (2) the user of an infringing mark may be 
attempting to benefit from the general goodwill developed 
by the holder of the protected mark." Id. 
 
Although there are numerous cases discussing secondary 
meaning, there is not yet a consensus as to its specific 
elements. See Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 292. A non- 
exclusive list of factors which may be considered includes: 
(1) the extent of sales and advertising leading to buyer 
association; (2) length of use; (3) exclusivity of use; (4) the 
fact of copying; (5) customer surveys; (6) customer 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
five consecutive years subsequent to registration, that there is no 
pending proceeding contesting the owner's rights to registration, and 
that there has been no adverse decision concerning the registrant's 
ownership or right to registration. See 15 U.S.C. SS 1058, 1065; Fisons 
Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., 30 F.3d 466, 472 n. 7 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
5. A mark is inherently distinctive if it may be fairly characterized as 
arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive. See Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 292 n. 
18. Neither CBI, CNIS, nor CIA contends that the Commerce mark is 
inherently distinctive. 
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testimony; (7) the use of the mark in trade journals; (8) the 
size of the company; (9) the number of sales; (10) the 
number of customers; and, (11) actual confusion. See id. 
 
"With respect to ownership of an unregistered mark, the 
first party to adopt a mark can assert ownership so long as 
it continuously uses the mark in commerce." Ford Motor 
Co., 930 F.2d at 292. However, where a senior user of a 
mark later expands into another industry and finds an 
intervening junior user, priority in the mark in the second 
industry depends on whether the senior user would 
normally or reasonably have been expected to expand into 
that industry. See J. Wise and Sons Co. v. W. E. Bassett 
Company, 462 F.2d 567, 569 (C.C.P.A. 1972). This, in turn, 
depends on whether the nature of the industries was such 
that purchasers would reasonably expect the services 
rendered by these industries to originate from a common 
source. See id. at 569; see also McCarthy, Trademarks, 
S 16:5; Volkswagenwerk Aktiengessellschaft v. Wheeler, 814 
F.2d 812, 815 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 
In addition to establishing validity and ownership,"a 
plaintiff must also prove likelihood of confusion, which is 
said to exist `when the consumers viewing the defendant's 
mark would probably assume that the product or service it 
represents is associated with the source of a different 
product or service identified by a similar mark.' " Ford 
Motor, 930 F.2d at 292 (quoting Scott Paper Co., 581 F.2d. 
at 1229). The likelihood of confusion analysis requires the 
evaluation of a number of factors including: (1) the degree 
of similarity between the owner's mark and the alleged 
infringing mark; (2) the strength of the owner's mark; (3) 
the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the 
care and attention expected of consumers when making a 
purchase; (4) the length of time defendant has used the 
mark without evidence of actual confusion arising; (5) the 
intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; (6) the 
evidence of actual confusion; (7) whether the goods, though 
not competing, are marketed through the same channels of 
trade and advertised through the same media; (8) the 
extent to which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are 
the same; (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of 
the public because of the similarity of function; (10) other 
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facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect 
the prior owner to expand into the defendant's market. See 
Scott Paper, 589 F.2d at 275. 
 
IV. 
 
We now turn to the District Court's specific findings of 
fact with respect to secondary meaning, ownership, and 
likelihood of confusion. 
 
A. 
 
After concluding that CBI's use of the "Commerce" mark 
"is not inherently distinctive and does not have great 
conceptual strength," the District Court found that the 
mark "does have substantial marketplace recognition value 
in New Jersey." Commerce Nat'l Ins. Servs. , 995 F.Supp. at 
499. In elaborating on this point, the Court continued: 
 
       Consumers viewing the term "Commerce" in front of a 
       bank, in connection with banking more generally, or in 
       a headline or article in a newspaper business section 
       may well assume they are dealing with CBI. Still, given 
       the frequency with which consumers see the term 
       "Commerce" -- and similar marks such as 
       "Commercial" -- they likely have come to recognize that 
       different goods and services identified by the term 
       "Commerce" mark may have different origins. On 
       balance, this Court concludes that the "Commerce" 
       mark, by virtue of its marketplace recognition, was 
       fairly strong in 1983 -- when CIA was founded-- and 
       is stronger today. It will be protected in connection 
       with banking and financial services. It also will be 
       protected in connection with some products and 
       services which are closely related to banking and 
       financial services in the minds of consumers. 
 
Id. 
 
Although the Court never specifically labeled the above 
rationale as its secondary meaning analysis, the parties 
agree that the language reflects the District Court's findings 
in this regard. The parties disagree, however, over the 
soundness of those findings. Naturally, CBI argues that 
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they are firmly supported by the evidence of record; CIA 
argues to the contrary. 
 
We believe that CIA has the more credible position. In our 
view, CBI failed to produce a sufficient quantum of evidence 
from which the Court could reasonably conclude that CBI 
had established secondary meaning in the "Commerce" 
mark within the general insurance services industry as of 
1983, the year in which CIA was established. 
 
CBI offered no evidence as to the extent to which it had 
promoted the "Commerce" mark by 1983. The only specific 
figure provided in the record involves the year of 1996, 
thirteen years later, when CBI claims to have spent more 
than $4 million to promote its services under the 
"Commerce" mark. The amount of money spent promoting 
the mark after 1983, however, is irrelevant. See Scott Paper 
Co., 589 F.2d at 1231; McCarthy, Trademarks , S 15:4. CBI 
attempts to divert attention from this irrelevant fact by 
pointing to a sentence in the District Court's opinion which 
states: "CBI has promoted the `Commerce' mark . . . widely 
through customer services, promotional materials, 
advertisements, and community service activities." 
Commerce Nat'l. Ins. Servs., 995 F. Supp. at 494. That 
statement, however, does not demonstrate that CBI had 
promoted the "Commerce" mark before 1983. Moreover, 
even if it were so intended, it would be clearly erroneous 
because there is no evidence of record to support such a 
finding. 
 
CBI's proof as to secondary meaning was deficient in 
other respects as well. First, CBI was unable to produce a 
single instance of actual confusion between it and CIA. The 
only evidence of actual confusion in this case relates to the 
dispute between CIA and CNIS. Although evidence of actual 
confusion is but one factor in the secondary meaning 
analysis, see Ford Motor Co., 930 F.2d at 292, CIA's and 
CBI's harmonious coexistence in the same geographical 
area for thirteen years most certainly cuts against CBI's 
claim to secondary meaning within the insurance services 
industry. Second, CBI offered no evidence to demonstrate 
that trade journals or other publications referred to it as 
"Commerce" in 1983. Instead, CBI offered two newspaper 
articles published in 1996. Although those articles do refer 
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to CBI as "Commerce," they do not aid in determining 
whether CBI was commonly identified by consumers as 
"Commerce" during the time period relevant to these 
actions. 
 
CBI also makes much of the "fact of copying" (i.e. the fact 
that CIA also uses the "Commerce" mark in its business 
name), but there is no evidence that CIA intended to leach 
off the goodwill of CBI by appropriating its mark. To the 
contrary, CIA limited the mark's use to general insurance 
services, a use to which CBI consciously acquiesced for 
thirteen years. Moreover, as noted by the District Court, the 
"Commerce" mark is not particularly distinctive. It is a 
common term used nationally in connection with a variety 
of businesses, and is even prominently embedded in our 
federal constitution. CIA's election to use such a 
commonplace term in naming its insurance agency is no 
more evidence of copying than was CBI's choice of the 
mark. At most, it is only minimally probative of whether 
CBI established secondary meaning in the "Commerce" 
mark in 1983. 
 
CBI also points to a recent customer satisfaction survey 
as evidence supportive of the District Court's finding that 
the mark achieved secondary meaning. However, CBI's 
reliance on that survey is misplaced because the survey is 
wholly irrelevant to whether CBI established secondary 
meaning in the "Commerce" mark as of 1983. First, based 
on the recency of the survey, it follows that it is not 
particularly probative of customer views in 1983. Second, 
and more importantly, customer surveys and customer 
testimony are relevant to the secondary meaning inquiry 
only insofar as they are probative of the strength of the 
"Commerce" mark in the collective consumer 
consciousness. The satisfaction of customers with CBI's 
services does little to demonstrate that when customers see 
the word "Commerce" they associate it with CBI. 
 
Finally, CBI also argues that the District Court did not 
clearly err in finding secondary meaning because at the 
time CIA began using the "Commerce" mark, CBI had 
already been using the mark for ten years; CBI's use of the 
mark was exclusive in the New Jersey service area with 
respect to banking; and, CBI was a relatively large bank 
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controlling over $100 million in assets. Although this 
evidence is probative of secondary meaning, it nevertheless 
is insufficient to support a finding of secondary meaning. 
CBI is attempting to establish secondary meaning in the 
non-competing insurance services industry, not the 
banking industry. Moreover, CBI is also attempting to 
establish rights to a commonplace, descriptive term used by 
a variety of businesses in a variety of contexts. In these 
circumstances, the evidentiary bar must be placed 
somewhat higher. See McCarthy, Trademarks, S 15:28. 
( "[A]s a general rule of thumb, the more descriptive the 
term, the greater the evidentiary burden to establish 
secondary meaning.") 
 
CBI offered no evidence that trade journals or other 
publications referred to it as "Commerce" in 1983. The 
record likewise reveals not a single CBI customer who ever 
confused CIA with CBI. Nor does the record contain any 
evidence as to the extent of CBI's promotional and 
advertising activities prior to 1983. In the absence of any 
evidence on these matters, CBI's status as a relatively large 
bank is insufficient to support the finding that CBI 
established secondary meaning in the Commerce mark with 
respect to the general insurance services industry. 
 
B. 
 
Turning now to the District Court's determinations with 
respect to ownership and likelihood of confusion, it found 
that CBI's rights in the Commerce mark were senior to 
those of CIA because CIA's use of the mark, as of 1983, 
created a likelihood of confusion. In so finding, it appears 
that the District Court conjoined its analysis of ownership 
with its analysis of likelihood of confusion. Although these 
are distinct elements of a trademark infringement claim, 
the District Court's choice not to separate them is of little 
consequence because the findings turn on substantially the 
same evidence. See McCarthy, Trademarks  S 16:5 (noting 
that when a senior user of a mark expands into a second 
service industry and finds an intervening junior user of the 
mark, ownership in the second industry is determined by 
whether the expansion is "natural" in that customers would 
have been confused as to source or affiliation at the time of 
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the intervening user's appearance). Nevertheless, because 
we believe the evidence presented by CBI insufficient to 
demonstrate a likelihood of confusion, we conclude that the 
Court's finding as to both of these elements was clear error. 
 
The District Court appears to have rested its finding of a 
likelihood of confusion primarily on the assumption that 
banking and insurance are similar industries in the minds 
of consumers and that consumers would expect banks to 
expand into the insurance industry. In this connection, the 
District Court stated that because "[t]he composite phrase 
`Banking and Insurance' probably has resonance in the 
consumer mind" and because "[c]onsumers have long been 
aware that banks seek to expand territorially and in terms 
of the products and services they offer . . . many reasonable 
consumers encountering `Commerce' in connection with 
insurance and financial planning would have assumed they 
were dealing with CBI or some offshoot." Commerce Nat'l 
Ins. Servs., 995 F.Supp. at 501. 
 
This speculative rationale amounts to little more than an 
assumption of consumer behavior for which there is little 
substantive proof of record. CBI's only evidence that a 
reasonable consumer in 1983 would have expected banks 
to expand into the insurance industry consisted of (1) a 
single affidavit in which CNIS's president and CEO stated 
that CBI offered credit life insurance and credit disability 
insurance beginning in December of 1974 and (2) an 
unpersuasive report from CBI's expert who concluded that 
reasonable consumers in 1983 would have expected banks 
to sell insurance. This evidence is insufficient to support a 
finding of likelihood of confusion for several reasons. 
 
First, although the affidavit of CNIS's president and CEO 
establishes that CBI offered credit life insurance and credit 
disability insurance in support of its loans to its banking 
customers, it does little to demonstrate that reasonable 
consumers in 1983 would have also expected CBI to be 
selling insurance generally, including the huge variety of 
liability and risk insurance. Likewise, CBI's expert's report 
does little to aid the inquiry. Although the report does list 
several surveys reflecting consumer attitudes and 
expectations with respect to the banking industry, only one 
of those surveys was taken during the time period relevant 
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to this action. That survey, taken in October of 1978, 
reflects that ". . . 94.2% of respondents replied they thought 
credit insurance was a good thing, the large majority 
without any qualifications." The survey does not, however, 
aid in a determination that consumers in 1983 expected 
banks to be engaged in the general insurance industry 
because it simply reveals that some consumers believed 
credit life insurance was "a good thing." It says nothing 
about the extent to which the consumers believed banks to 
be engaged in the insurance business. Moreover, even if it 
did, it is not at all clear that the impressions of the 
respondents in that survey reflected how New Jersey 
consumers viewed the banking industry.6  
 
It is also important to note that New Jersey law severely 
limited banks from engaging in the general insurance 
industry at the time CIA was formed. By statute, see e.g. 
N.J.S.A. SS 17:3C-1 and 17:19A-213.1 (West 1984), banks 
could not sell general insurance services or products until 
1996 when the United States Supreme Court decided 
Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 
(1996). This prior statutory bar eviscerates the possibility 
that prior to 1996 southern New Jersey consumers 
reasonably expected CBI to engage in the insurance 
industry. Moreover, it is apparent that CBI had no 
expectation of engaging in the general insurance industry 
until the Barnett decision in 1996. 
 
Furthermore, not only was CBI's evidence of a likelihood 
of confusion insufficient, but there was also other evidence 
tending to suggest there was no danger of confusion 
between CIA and CBI in 1983. A review of the record 
reveals not a single instance in which a consumer actually 
confused CIA with CBI. To the contrary, the record reveals 
that, from 1983 through 1996, CBI and CIA coexisted 
amicably, even referred customers to one another, and 
operated in their respective spheres of interest without any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. As noted, CBI's expert did conclude in his report that a reasonable 
consumer would have expected CBI to be engaged in the insurance 
business; however, his report failed to set forth a sufficient basis from 
which to reasonably draw that conclusion and therefore offers little 
support of consumer confusion. 
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confusion. Confusion only developed early in 1997 after CBI 
elected to enter the insurance business by forming CNIS. 
CBI attempts to undercut the impact of the lack of evidence 
of confusion prior to CNIS's entry into the New Jersey 
insurance market by arguing that the parties' investigation 
into the matter was minimal. This argument, however, 
ignores that the burden of proving likelihood of confusion 
rested on CBI. 
 
CBI also attempts to make much of the similarity 
between the marks of the two companies. However, until 
CBI decided to enter the insurance industry, neither party 
challenged the other's use of the mark. Of course, the 
Commerce mark is the same no matter who uses it, but 
this evidence is not particularly probative of a likelihood of 
confusion because Commerce is a commonplace mark used 
by countless businesses in countless contexts. The District 
Court conceded as much during its analysis of the mark 
and noted that "given the frequency with which consumers 
see the term `Commerce' . . . they likely have come to 
recognize that different goods and services identified by the 
term `Commerce' may have different origins." See Commerce 
Nat'l Ins. Servs., 995 F.Supp. at 499. 
 
Finally, as noted above, there is little evidence from 
which one could conclude that CBI's Commerce mark was 
particularly strong in 1983. CBI offered no customer 
surveys or testimony tending to suggest that the consuming 
public readily identified the Commerce mark with CBI. Nor 
did CBI offer any evidence as to the extent to which it had 
promoted the Commerce mark prior to CIA's entry into the 
insurance market. Because the Commerce mark is not 
inherently distinctive and because CBI adduced no evidence 
to demonstrate that the mark had developed significant 
marketplace recognition prior to 1983, it is difficult to 
conclude that the mark was particularly strong. 
 
In sum, the record is critically deficient of that minimum 
quantum of evidence from which the District Court could 
have reasonably found that CIA's use of the Commerce 
mark in 1983 resulted in a likelihood of confusion. CBI had 
an opportunity to undertake discovery and to prepare for a 
trial. Instead, it chose, along with CIA, to run the risk of 
relying on the slender record presented with its request for 
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a preliminary injunction. That record supports neither the 
findings of secondary meaning, ownership, nor likelihood of 
confusion. As Judge Learned Hand observed in Federal 
Telephone & Radio Corp. v. Federal Television Corp. , 180 
F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1950), which involved a suit by Federal 
Telephone & Radio Corp. to enjoin the defendant as the 
junior user of the name "Federal:" "we should have no 
warrant for depriving the defendant of whatever good-will it 
has already acquired by its sales under its own name. It 
started the use in entire good faith, the word is in general 
use for all sorts of purposes, and the plaintiff 's pretension 
to monopolize it is without any present basis that we can 
discover." Id. at 251-151. Accordingly, it was error to 
conclude that CBI possessed rights to the exclusive use of 
the Commerce mark in the insurance services industry. 
 
V. 
 
We now turn to the merits of CIA's claim against CNIS. 
The non-existent rights of CBI can no longer serve to shield 
its wholly-owned subsidiary, CNIS, from liability. CIA 
contends that CNIS's use of the Commerce mark infringes 
CIA's rights in the mark because CNIS's use of the mark 
results in reverse confusion. CIA is entitled to a remand on 
this claim only if the record contains sufficient evidence 
from which the District Court could reasonably conclude 
that: (1) CIA's Commerce mark is valid and legally 
protectable; (2) CIA owns the Commerce mark; and (3) 
CNIS's use of the Commerce mark results in reverse 
confusion. See Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, 
Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 474 (3d Cir. 1994) (adopting the doctrine 
of reverse confusion); Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. 
McCabe, 593 F.2d 234, 239 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that a 
remand is unnecessary where evidence of record would not 
support a finding in favor of party seeking remand). We 
address each of these issues in turn. 
 
A. 
 
Although CIA has registered the Commerce mark with 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the mark 
has yet to achieve incontestability. Therefore, to 
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demonstrate that the Commerce mark is valid and legally 
protectable, CIA must demonstrate that it had established 
secondary meaning in the Commerce mark as of 1996, the 
year in which CNIS began use of the mark. See Ford Motor 
Co., 930 F.2d at 292. Although CIA's evidence of secondary 
meaning suffers from some of the same weaknesses as 
CBI's proof, we think CIA's evidence sufficient to permit a 
finding that CIA has established secondary meaning in the 
Commerce mark within the insurance services industry. 
 
Unlike CBI, CIA is not attempting to establish secondary 
meaning in the Commerce mark with respect to services 
which it has yet to offer. Rather, CIA is simply asserting 
that it has established secondary meaning in the Commerce 
mark with respect to the insurance services it had offered 
under that mark for thirteen years prior to the formation of 
CNIS and continues to offer. We think it a reasonable 
inference that during those thirteen years CIA was able to 
build up substantial good-will for its general insurance 
services under the Commerce mark.7 It not only sold 
general insurance continuously during this period but also 
expanded to larger offices. Moreover, we note that in the 
context of a reverse confusion case, the evidentiary burden 
upon a smaller, senior user to establish the existence of 
secondary meaning is placed somewhat lower. See Elizabeth 
Taylor Cosmetics Company, Inc. v. Annick Goutal, 673 
F.Supp. 1238, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)("[A] minimal showing 
of secondary meaning is required in a reverse confusion 
case."). Otherwise, "a larger company could with impunity 
infringe the senior mark of a smaller one." Banff, Ltd. v. 
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that CIA's proffered 
evidence is sufficient to support a finding of secondary 
meaning in the insurance industry. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Although that good-will may be limited geographically to an area no 
greater than southern New Jersey, the fact remains that, within that 
area, CIA has offered sufficient evidence from which a finding of 
secondary meaning can be made. 
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B. 
 
Turning now to the question of ownership, there is 
sufficient evidence in the record from which the District 
Court may reach the conclusion that CIA owns the 
Commerce mark within the insurance services industry of 
southern New Jersey. CIA began using the mark in that 
industry in 1983; CNIS did not commence its use until 
1996. 
 
C. 
 
Finally, we turn to the issue of reverse confusion. This 
Court adopted the doctrine of reverse confusion in Fisons 
Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Industries, Inc., 30 F.3d 466 (3d 
Cir. 1994). In so doing, we explained that "[r]everse 
confusion occurs when a larger, more powerful company 
uses the trademark of a smaller, less powerful senior owner 
and thereby causes likely confusion as to the source of the 
senior user's goods or services." Id. at 474. Quoting the 
Sixth Circuit's decision in Ameritech, Inc. v. American 
Information Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (1987), 
we elaborated: 
 
       the junior user saturates the market with a similar 
       trademark and overwhelms the senior user. The public 
       comes to assume the senior user's products are really 
       the junior user's or that the former has become 
       somehow connected to the latter. The result is that the 
       senior user loses the value of the trademark -- its 
       product identity, corporate identity, control over its 
       goodwill and reputation, and ability to move into new 
       markets. 
 
Id. at 474-75. 
 
After adopting the doctrine of reverse confusion, we 
proceeded to assess the plaintiff 's reverse confusion claim 
in light of the Scott Paper factors. In doing so, we 
acknowledged that certain of these factors must be 
reworked in the context of a reverse confusion case. For 
example, when applying the strength of mark factor, the 
lack of commercial strength of the smaller senior user's 
mark is to be given less weight in the analysis because it is 
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the strength of the larger, junior user's mark which results 
in reverse confusion. See id. at 479. Likewise, the intent 
inquiry must also be altered to focus on whether the 
defendant was aware of the senior user's use of the mark 
in question, or whether the defendant conducted an 
adequate name search for other companies marketing 
similar goods or services under that mark. See id. at 480. 
 
Consideration of CIA's reverse confusion claim in light of 
these modified Scott Paper factors reveals that there is a 
significant likelihood of reverse confusion in this case. CIA 
and CNIS are engaged in the same line of business. In 
addition, the "Commerce" mark used by the parties is 
identical. Although CNIS has added the words "National" 
and "Services" to its mark, the record reveals that instances 
of confusion between CIA and CNIS have already occurred 
despite the addition of these terms. 
 
CNIS's ability to promote its mark is also much greater 
than that of CIA's. The formation of CNIS was immediately 
followed by two newspaper articles providing accounts of 
CBI's expansion into the insurance industry through the 
formation of CNIS. In addition, CBI has boasted that it 
spent $4 million to promote the "Commerce" mark in 1996. 
Although these funds appear to have been spent promoting 
the mark in connection with CBI's banking services, it is 
likely that similar funds will be used in the future to 
promote the mark in connection with CNIS's insurance 
activities. Moreover, it is also possible that CNIS will have 
a substantial advertising budget of its own. In the short 
period of its existence, CNIS already has become the 58th 
largest insurance agency in the nation, serving more than 
38,000 individuals and businesses. Although the exact size 
of CIA is not known, it is obvious that CIA does not have 
similar resources to develop a high-powered promotional 
campaign. 
 
Furthermore, CBI was well aware of CIA and its mark 
when it decided to form CNIS and enter the general 
insurance services market. The two had known each other 
for years; they had done business with each other; they had 
referred individuals and businesses to each other. CBI 
made a conscious decision to track the CIA name for its 
subsidiary, merely adding "National" when it entered the 
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insurance industry. It is not entirely clear whether CBI's 
motive was to push CIA out of the market or whether CBI 
simply saw an opportunity to promote both its insurance 
and banking activities under a common mark. 
Nevertheless, the doctrine of reverse confusion is designed 
to prevent the calamitous situation we have here-- a 
larger, more powerful company usurping the business 
identity of a smaller senior user. See Fisons , 30 F.3d at 474 
("Without recognition of reverse confusion, smaller senior 
users would have little protection against, larger more 
powerful companies who want to use identical or 
confusingly similar trademarks."). 
 
In sum, there is ample evidence of record that CNIS's use 
of the "Commerce" mark will result in reverse confusion. 
CNIS by virtue of its superior size, resources, and economic 
strength, as well as the support of its powerful and 
aggressive parent, may be able to saturate the market with 
advertising so that the public will likely believe that CIA is 
an affiliate of CNIS or possibly an interloper. 
 
VI. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the District 
Court's order denying CIA's request for an injunction 
against CNIS from using the Commerce mark will be 
vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings as 
are consistent with this opinion. 
 
Upon remand, the District Court should make 
appropriate findings of fact as to whether (1) CIA has 
sufficient secondary meaning in the Commerce mark in the 
insurance industry, (2) the ownership of the mark, and (3) 
the likelihood of confusion in the use of the Commerce 
mark by CNIS, either in its name as presently formed or 
modified. As the concurrence observes, nothing in this 
opinion precludes the District Court on remand, if the 
evidence so warrants, from permitting CNIS to continue 
doing business under the "Commerce National Insurance 
Services" name. If, on the other hand, the Courts concludes 
that CIA's evidence establishes the foregoing elements of 
the trademark infringement claim, then it should grant CIA 
appropriate equitable relief. 
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Costs taxed against Commerce National Insurance 
Services, Inc. and Commerce Bancorp, Inc. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I write merely to make clear my understanding of what 
the court's opinion will allow the District Court to do on 
remand. In its judgment, the District Court enjoined CIA 
from using the term "National" as part of its service mark 
and/or business name. At the same time, the District Court 
enjoined CNIS from using the abbreviated business name 
and/or service mark "Commerce Insurance." Neither party 
objected on appeal to those portions of the District Court's 
order. I join the majority's opinion because I understand 
that nothing therein would preclude the District Court, on 
remand, from permitting CNIS to continue doing business 
under the name "Commerce National Insurance Services." 
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